DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS 

 
Application for the Correction of 
the Coast Guard Record of: 
 
                                                                                BCMR Docket No. 2007-176 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx   

FINAL DECISION 

 

 
 

 

 

 

This is a proceeding under the provisions of section 1552 of title 10 and section 425 of 
title 14 of the United States Code.  The Chair docketed the case on August 15, 2007, upon receipt 
of  the  applicant’s  completed  application,  and  assigned  it  to  staff  member  J.  Andrews  to  pre-
pare the decision for the Board as required by 33 C.F.R. § 52.61(c). 
 
 
appointed members who were designated to serve as the Board in this case. 
 

This  final  decision,  dated  June  12,  2008,  is  approved  and  signed  by  the  three  duly 

APPLICANT’S REQUEST AND ALLEGATIONS  

The applicant, who was discharged on May 18, 1989, for unsuitability after incurring two 
“alcohol incidents” asked the Board to correct his record to show that he was discharged due to a 
medical disability.  He alleged that he was diagnosed with a mental illness while on active duty 
and that his abuse of alcohol was just a symptom of the mental illness.  He further alleged that he 
has received treatment for mental illness since his discharge. 

 
The applicant claimed that he discovered the error in his record on April 1, 2007, when 
he was denied health care by the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) because he did not 
complete at least two years of his enlistment.  He argued that it is in the interest of justice for the 
Board to waive the statute of limitations so that he can receive medical care from the DVA. 
 

SUMMARY OF THE RECORD 

On April 18, 1988, at age 19, the applicant enlisted in the Coast Guard for a term of four 
years.  On his pre-enlistment physical examination, he denied having abused alcohol.  On April 
26,  1988,  during  recruit  training,  the  applicant  signed  a  CG-3307  (“Page  7”)  acknowledging 
having received “a full explanation of the drug and alcohol abuse program.”  On June 17, 1988, 
he completed recruit training and advanced from seaman recruit to fireman apprentice (FA/E-2).  
On July 9, 1988, he reported for duty on a cutter. 

 

On  September  9,  1988,  the  applicant  underwent  a  medical  evaluation  because  of  an 
“alcohol incident” on September 1, 1988.  The doctor noted that the applicant’s “supervisors also 
report  an  alcohol  problem  since  he  reported  aboard.    [The  applicant]  also  has  reported  being 
depressed over his job assignment and has been unable to get along with his supervisors.”  The 
doctor  diagnosed  the  applicant  with  an  “adjustment  disorder  with  depressed  mood”  and  with 
“chronic episodic alcoholism.”  The doctor recommended that the following treatments:  Alco-
holics  Anonymous  meetings  three  times  per  week,  an  alcohol  awareness  program,  an  alcohol 
rehabilitation program, and psychotherapy. 

 
On September 14, 1988, the applicant was taken to captain’s mast and awarded nonjudi-
cial  punishment  (NJP)  for  being  drunk,  loud,  and  disorderly  and  offending  passengers  on  the 
Governor’s Island ferry on September 1, 1988, in violation of Article 134 of the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice (UCMJ).1   

 
On September 14, 1988, the applicant was seen by a psychotherapist, who noted that he 

was feeling “mild depression” and was in alcohol rehabilitation therapy. 

 
On  October  4,  1988,  the  Executive  Officer  (XO)  of  the  cutter  entered  a  Page  7  in  the 
applicant’s record stating that he was “required to participate in the following alcohol monitoring 
program  in  lieu  of  assignment  to  inpatient  alcohol  rehabilitation  program.”    The  monitoring 
program included supervised use of “Antabuse” for six months, mandatory attendance at Alco-
holics Anonymous meetings three times per week, and weekly progress meetings with the unit’s 
Collateral Duty Alcohol Representative (CDAR).  The applicant acknowledged the Page 7 by 
signature. 

 
On February 11, 1989, the XO entered a Page 7 in the applicant’s record documenting the 
fact  that  his  previously  mandatory  use  of  the  drug  “Antabuse”  was  thereafter  to  be  voluntary 
because of his complaints of excessive drowsiness.  The Page 7 further states that the “burden for 
avoiding future alcohol abuse incidents remains with you.  Further incidents will lead to admin-
istrative  processing  for  separation  and  disciplinary  actions.”    The  applicant  acknowledged  the 
Page 7 by signature. 

 
On February 22, 1989, the applicant was taken to captain’s mast and awarded NJP for 
being drunk and disorderly aboard the cutter on February 18, 1989, in violation of Article 134 of 
the UCMJ. 

 
On March 13, 1989, the XO entered a Page 7 in the applicant’s record to document the 
“drunk and disorderly disturbance” for which he was taken to mast and awarded NJP on Febru-
ary 22, 1989.  The Page 7 notes that because it was his second alcohol abuse incident, he was 
being  processed  for  separation  pursuant  to  Article  20-B-2.d.  of  the  Personnel  Manual.    The 
applicant acknowledged the Page 7 by signature. 

 

                                                 
1 Under Article 134 of the UCMJ, to be guilty of drunk and disorderly conduct, the finder of fact must determine  
(1) that the accused was drunk, disorderly, or drunk and disorderly on board ship or in some other place; and (2) 
that, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the 
armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.  Manual for Courts-Martial (2008). 

On March 23, 1989, the applicant’s commanding officer (CO) informed the applicant in a 
memorandum that he was initiating the applicant’s discharge in accordance with Article 20-B-2 
of the Personnel Manual because of his two alcohol incidents.  The CO also informed the appli-
cant that he was entitled to submit a statement on his own behalf.  The applicant acknowledged 
receipt of the notification and indicated that he would submit a statement on his own behalf.  He 
submitted a statement saying, “I sincerely regret my earlier disagreements and I am serious about 
my career status in the Coast Guard.”  He also wrote that he had at first found it difficult to adapt 
to military life but that he wanted to stay in the Service to become a health services technician. 

 
On April 3, 1989, the CO submitted a recommendation, which was required by Article 
20-B-2  of  the  Personnel  Manual,  that  the  applicant  be  discharged  because  of  his  two  alcohol 
abuse incidents.  The CO requested that the applicant be retained on active duty despite Coast 
Guard policy as follows: 

 
3.  I request that [the applicant] be retained for further service.  I am now satisfied that he fully 
realizes the seriousness of his situation.  He wants to continue within the Coast Guard and over-
come  his  problem  with  alcohol.    I  believe  he  can  become  a  fully  functioning  member  in  good 
standing. 
 
4.   The  alcohol  abuse  program  manager  in  MLC  (k)  has  directed  us  to  obtain  an  inpatient  bed 
reservation for treatment, which will be utilized should Commandant authorize retention. 
 
5.  Should he not be retained, I recommend an Honorable Discharge. 
 
On April 12, 1989, the command of the cutter informed Headquarters that the applicant 
“no longer desires to remain in the Coast guard and this unit concurs with discharge.”  On April 
18, 1989, the applicant submitted a written request to be discharged to the Commandant through 
his chain of command.  On April 19, 1989, the Commandant approved the expedited discharge 
of the applicant for unsuitability with separation code JMG. 

 
On May 10, 1989, the applicant underwent a medical examination in preparation for his 
discharge.  He complained of feeling weak because the “ship’s food upsets [his] stomach.”  The 
doctor  found  that  he  had  no  physical  disabilities  and  was  fit  for  discharge.    He  also  recom-
mended that the applicant attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings or other support treatment. 

 
On  May  18,  1989,  the  applicant  was  honorably  discharged  from  the  Coast  Guard  for 
“unsuitability” with separation code JMG, which denotes alcohol abuse, and an RE-4 reenlist-
ment code (ineligible to reenlist).  He had completed one year, one month, and one day of active 
duty. 

 
On January 20, 1993, the applicant underwent a psychiatric evaluation and was diagnosed 
with recurrent depression, alcohol dependency, and borderline personality traits.  The applicant 
reported to the doctor that he had felt “down” since age 8 when he was molested by a brother’s 
friend.  He complained of having flashbacks and nightmares about the molestation and about his 
“experience in the government.”  He admitted to “heavy alcohol intake since age 8,” smoking 
marijuana, and experimenting with other drugs. 

 

Subsequent medical records show that the applicant has been diagnosed at various times 
with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), cocaine addiction, marijuana abuse, alcohol abuse, 
borderline  personality  disorder,  recurrent  major  depression,  an  unspecified  psychotic  disorder, 
and chronic homelessness.  On April 30, 2002, the applicant was hospitalized after threatening 
suicide when he was evicted from a homeless shelter.   A  doctor noted that the  applicant was 
“mildly ill” but was “manipulative—presenting symptoms in exaggerated or made-up manner.”  
He  diagnosed  the  applicant  with  a  personality  disorder  and  a  “polysubstance  abuse  induced 
mood disorder.” 

 
On January 29, 2007, the applicant filed a claim with the DVA for medical benefits for 
depression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and PTSD.  He claimed that while on active duty, he 
suffered  hazings,  beatings,  and  torment  from  shipmates  and  officers.    The  DVA  denied  his 
claims,  finding  that  while  on  active  duty,  the  applicant  was  only  treated  for  alcoholism  that 
existed prior to his enlistment and for “an adjustment disorder with depressed mood due to dis-
contentment with the ship.”  The DVA found insufficient evidence that the applicant’s mental 
illness was incurred during or caused by his military service. 
 

VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

 
 
On January 2, 2008, the Judge Advocate General (JAG) submitted an advisory opinion in 
which he recommended that the Board deny relief in this case.  In so doing, he adopted the facts 
and analysis provided in a memorandum on the case by CGPC. 
 
 
CGPC stated that the application was untimely and that the applicant had not justified his 
delay in seeking the requested correction.  Moreover, CGPC argued that the Coast Guard com-
mitted no error or injustice in discharging the applicant since he incurred two alcohol incidents, 
was  found  medically  fit  for  discharge,  and  ultimately  requested  to  be  discharged  in  writing.  
CGPC stated that there is nothing in the applicant’s military medical or personnel record to sup-
port his claim that he suffered hazings, beatings, unfair treatment, or mental or physical disability 
while on active duty. 

 

APPLICANT’S RESPONSE TO THE VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

 
 
On January 7, 2008, the Chair sent a copy of the Coast Guard’s advisory opinion to the 
applicant’s address of record and invited him to respond within thirty days.  When the mailing 
was  returned  by  the  Post  Office,  the  BCMR  staff  called  the  applicant,  who  provided  a  new 
address.  A copy of the advisory opinion was sent to the applicant at his new address on January 
28, 2008, with another invitation to respond within thirty days.  On March 5, 2008, the applicant 
requested  a  thirty-day  extension  of  the  time  to  respond.    The  extension  was  granted,  but  no 
response was received.   

APPLICABLE REGULATIONS 

 

 

Article 12-B-16.b.(5) of the Personnel Manual in effect in 1989 authorizes the discharge 
members for unsuitability by reason of alcohol abuse.  Article 12-B-16.d. states that members 

being  honorably  discharged  for  unsuitability  shall  be  informed  of  the  pending  separation  and 
afforded an opportunity to submit a statement. 

 
Article 20-A-2.d. defines an “alcohol incident” as “[a]ny violation of the UCMJ, Federal, 
State, or local laws, or injury resulting in the member’s loss of ability to perform assigned duties, 
in which alcohol is determined to be a significant or causative factor.”  Article 20-B-2.d. states 
that “[e]nlisted members involved in a second alcohol incident will normally be processed for 
separation by reason of unsuitability due to alcohol abuse under Article 12-B-16.  In those cases 
where the commanding officer/officer in charge feels that an exceptional situation warrants con-
sideration for retention, the enlisted member will be screened and a letter request for retention 
and treatment … shall be forwarded via the chain of command to Commandant …” 

 
Chapter 5-B-4 of the Medical Manual in effect in 1989 states that members diagnosed 
with a substance abuse disorder should be processed for administrative separation in accordance 
with  Article  20  of  the  Personnel  Manual.    Chapter  5-B-16  of  the  Medical  Manual  states  that 
adjustment disorders are “generally treatable and not grounds for separation.” 

 
Article 2.C.2.a. of the Physical Disability Evaluation System (PDES) Manual in effect in 
1989 states that the “sole standard to be used in making determinations of physical disability as a 
basis for retirement or separation shall be unfitness to perform the duties of office, grade, rank or 
rating because of disease or injury incurred or aggravated while entitled to basic pay.”  Article 
2.C.2.b. states the following: 

 

(2)  Service members who are being processed for separation or retirement for reasons 
other than physical disability shall not be referred for disability evaluation unless their  physical 
condition  reasonably  prompts  doubt  that  they  are  fit  to  continue  to  perform  the  duties  of  their 
office, grade, rank or rating. 
 

 
The law that provides for disability retirement or separation … is designed to compensate mem-
bers whose military service is terminated due to a physical disability that has rendered the member 
unfit for continued duty.  That law and this disability evaluation system are not to be misused to 
bestow compensation benefits on those who are voluntarily or mandatorily retiring or separating 
and have theretofore drawn pay and allowances, received promotions, and continued on unlimited 
active  duty  status  while  tolerating  physical  impairments  that  have  not  actually  precluded  Coast 
Guard service.  The following policies apply. 
 

(1)  Continued performance of duty until a service member is scheduled for separation or 
retirement for reasons other than physical disability creates a presumption of fitness for duty.  This 
presumption may be overcome if it is established by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
 

(a)  the service member, because of disability, was physically unable to perform 

adequately the duties of office, grade, rank or rating; or 

(b)  acute, grave illness or injury, or other deterioration of the member’s physi-
cal condition occurred immediately prior to or coincident with processing for separation 
or retirement for reasons other than physical disability which rendered the service mem-
ber unfit for further duty. 

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

The Board makes the following findings and conclusions on the basis of the applicant's 

 
 
military record and submissions, the Coast Guard's submissions, and applicable law: 
 

The Board has jurisdiction concerning this matter pursuant to section 1552 of title 

1. 

10 of the United States Code.   
 

 
3. 

 
4. 

 
5. 

2. 

The applicant alleged that his discharge for unsuitability was erroneous and unjust 
and asked the Board to correct his record to show that he was medically discharged.  An appli-
cation to the Board must be filed within three years after the applicant discovers the alleged error 
in his record.2  The applicant was discharged in 1989, and he knew or should have known at that 
time that he had not been medically discharged.  Therefore, although he alleged on his applica-
tion  that  he  discovered  the  error  on  April  1,  2007,  the  Board  finds  that  his  application  was 
untimely. 

Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b), the  Board may  excuse the untimeliness of an 
application if it is in the interest of justice to do so.  In Allen v. Card, 799 F. Supp. 158, 164 
(D.D.C. 1992), the court stated that to determine whether the interest of justice supports a waiver 
of the statute of limitations, the Board “should analyze both the reasons for the delay and the 
potential merits of the claim based on a cursory review.”  The court further instructed that “the 
longer the delay has been and the weaker the reasons are for the delay, the more compelling the 
merits would need to be to justify a full review.”3   

The applicant did not justify his delay in applying to the Board but argued that it 
is in the interest of justice for the Board to waive the statute of limitations so that he can become 
eligible for medical benefits from the DVA.  The Board finds this argument uncompelling. 

The applicant alleged that he was mentally ill in 1989 and entitled to a medical 
separation.  Under Article 2.C.2.a. of the PDES Manual in effect in 1989, the “sole standard to 
be used in making determinations of physical disability as a basis for retirement or separation 
shall  be  unfitness  to  perform  the  duties  of  office,  grade,  rank  or  rating  because  of  disease  or 
injury incurred or aggravated while entitled to basic pay.”  The record shows that the applicant 
was fit for duty in 1989, and his command even tried to retain him on active duty despite his 
alcohol incidents.  The only mental conditions with which the applicant was diagnosed while on 
active duty were (a) chronic, episodic alcoholism, which apparently pre-existed his enlistment, 
and (b) an adjustment disorder with depressed mood because he disliked his job, crewmates, and 
supervisors in the Coast Guard.  These diagnoses are presumptively correct,4 and neither condi-
tion qualified the applicant for disability processing or a medical separation under the Medical 
Manual and PDES Manual.  Under Chapters 5-B-4 and 5-B-16 of the Medical Manual in effect 
in  1989,  adjustment  disorders  were  not  disqualifying  medical  disabilities,  and  members  who 
repetitively abused alcohol were to be processed for administrative separation under Articles 20-
B-2 and 12-B-16 of the Personnel Manual, not for medical evaluation and separation under the 
                                                 
2 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b).   
3 Id. at 164-65.   See also Dickson v. Secretary of Defense, 68 F.3d 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
4 33 C.F.R. § 52.24(b). 

PDES Manual.  Although after his discharge the applicant apparently blamed the Coast Guard 
for many of his mental problems, there is no persuasive evidence in the record indicating that the 
applicant incurred or aggravated any mental disability, such as PTSD or bipolar disorder, during 
his thirteen months in the Service.  The applicant has submitted insufficient evidence to over-
come the presumption of regularity accorded his military records and the Coast Guard’s decision 
to  discharge  him  for  alcohol  abuse.5    The  Board  also  notes  that  the  applicant  received  due 
process under Article 12-B-16 of the Personnel Manual in that he was informed of the pending 
discharge and given the opportunity to submit a statement on his own behalf. 
 

Accordingly,  because  of  the  lack  of  a  compelling  excuse  for  the  application’s 
untimeliness and the apparent lack of merit in the applicant’s claim, the Board finds that it is not 
in the interest of justice to waive the statute of limitations in this case.  Therefore, the application 
should be denied. 
 
 
 

6. 

[ORDER AND SIGNATURES APPEAR ON NEXT PAGE] 

                                                 
5  Absent  evidence  to  the  contrary,  the  Board  presumes  that  Coast  Guard  officers  have  performed  their  duties 
“correctly, lawfully, and in good faith.” Arens v. United States, 969 F.2d 1034, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sanders v. 
United States, 594 F.2d 804, 813 (Ct. Cl. 1979); 33 C.F.R. § 52.24(b). 

The application of former xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, USCG, for correction of 

ORDER 

 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

        

 
 
 Evan R. Franke 

 

 
 Robert S. Johnson 

 

 

 
 
 Adrian Sevier 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

his military record is denied.